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Summary and Implications
In addition to futures and options markets, long-term
risk sharing hog procurement contracts offered by packers
provide some degree of price risk protection for pork
producers. The window contract and a moving average
hedging strategy generated similar average returns and level
of profit risk protection. The cost-plus contract provided a
greater degree of risk protection from prices below cost of
production and used a ledger account to ensure that prices
average the same as the cash market over the long run. 
Introduction
The futures market has long been available for pork
producers to manage price risk for input purchases and
output sales. However, relatively few pork producers use
these tools (7). Yet risk management continues to be
referenced as a key consideration for existing, as well as
expanding and highly leveraged producers. Many expanding
producers are entering long-term, risk-sharing marketing
contracts with packers.
 These extra-market transactions raise concerns to some
in the industry regarding issues of market access, market
reporting, and price discovery. Producers considering such
contracts have expressed reservations about committing to
only one packer. Effective hedging strategies that offer
similar price- and profit-risk management to packer contracts
would offer producers an alternative to long-term packer
contracts. Such use of the futures market allows the producer
to separate risk management from cash marketing decisions.
Although not without concerns from producers about its
influence on cash prices, managing risk in the futures market
reduces broader market performance concerns.
Previous risk management and futures market studies of
the live hog contract using ex ante prices typically show
that the cash market provides larger, but more variable
returns than routine hedging strategies. Selective hedging
strategies using technical analysis have generated higher
mean returns and comparable-to-less-risky returns (Hales,
Bresee). The typical standard of comparison in most
hedging studies is the cash market. However, in today's
pork industry, producers may have other risk management
alternatives available.
This paper is work in progress to examine alternative
risk management strategies for pork producers. Two
hypothetical packer contracts similar to those offered in the
industry today are simulated and compared with prices
produced by a simple, moving average, selective hedging
strategy, and the cash market. Net prices received and
budgeted returns for a typical farrow-to-finish operation over
a 10-year period will be examined. Following is a brief
description and history of packer contracts and the specifics
of the two contracts that are examined here. Next is a
description of a relatively simple hedging strategy that was
also evaluated. The paper ends with a discussion of the
results and promising areas of future research.
Long-term packer contracts. In recent years, long-term
marketing agreements have emerged between hog producers
and pork packers. A recent University of Missouri study
indicated that approximately 26% of hogs marketed in 1994
were sold on a formula pricing agreement (Rhodes and
Grimes). A much smaller, but growing percentage involved
some type of price risk-sharing arrangement between the
producer and packer. Two risk-sharing arrangements that
have been offered by packers are the cost-plus and window
contracts (6). The cost-plus contract bases the minimum
price the producer receives for hogs on a standardized cost of
production and the factors that influence costs (e.g., feed
prices). The window contract sets an upper and lower price
boundary and the producer receives the market price if it falls
within these boundaries or window of prices. When prices
are outside the window, the "pain or gain" is shared between
the buyer and seller.
After the very low hog prices of late 1994 and the
historically high grain prices of 1996, producers have
become increasingly interested in some method of managing
price risk. Likewise, lenders are encouraging producers to
develop management and marketing strategies that increase
the probability that operations can service debt payments in
a timely manner. Declining hog production in traditional
Hog Belt states with excess packer capacity, such as Iowa,
has prompted packers to look for ways to secure a steady
supply of hogs. Survey work by Rhodes, Hayenga, Grimes,
and Lawrence confirms that long-term, risk-sharing contracts
manage price risk (and possibly profit risk) for hog
producers, increasing their ability to access capital and grow
their operations. Such agreements also serve to secure a
supply of known quality hogs for a packer.
Although risk-sharing contracts offer advantages to both
buyers and sellers, questions remain as to how these
marketing contracts perform relative to the cash market or
hedging strategies that the producer could easily implement.
Risk-sharing contracts are difficult to analyze. First, not all
packers offer a contract; contracts do differ between packers
and contract provisions have evolved over time as the
market for contracts matures. Second, the contracts are
typically confidential in nature and the details of specific
contracts are not observable. This paper will model two
hypothetical contracts based on reported features of
contractsÑa cost-plus contract and a window-price contract.
The analysis is not intended to represent a specific contract
offered by a packer, but rather to reflect a general type of
agreement that may be available to producers. The prices
resulting from the contracts and a relatively simple futures
hedging strategy will be compared with the Iowa-Southern
Minnesota cash market over a 10-year period.
Materials and Methods
The cash market price used was the weekly average
U.S. 1Ñ2, 220Ñ260 lb. barrows and gilts in the Iowa-
Southern Minnesota market reported by the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA). Central Iowa weekly
average corn prices paid to farmers were adjusted upward
$0.20 per bushel to more closely reflect a river bid often
used in cost-plus contracts. Decatur, Illinois, soybean meal
prices (SBM) for Thursday were also used. The analysis
assumed that the producer sold hogs each week and weekly
prices from January 1987 through December 1996 were
used. Futures prices used were the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange Live Hog contract prices.
Cost-plus contract. The cost of production in cost-plus
contracts is typically meant to represent that of above-
average producers. The cost-plus contract in this analysis
assumes a standard production budget based on an 8-week
rolling average corn and SBM price. The budget has a
whole-herd feed efficiency of 350 lb. of feed per cwt. of
hog produced, and an 80% corn and 20% SBM diet. An
additional $35 per ton of feed was included for vitamin and
mineral premix, any feed additives, and grind, mix, and
deliver charges. Nonfeed cost was set at $14/cwt. to cover
other variable and overhead costs. Table 1 illustrates cost-
plus prices at alternative corn and SBM prices. For
example, the estimated cost of production per cwt. with
$2.50/bu. river basis corn and $200/ton Decatur SBM is
$39.63/cwt. At $4.50/bu. corn and $200/ton SBM, the cost
increases to $49.63/cwt. Five dollars per cwt. was added to
the estimated cost of production as the ÒplusÓ in the cost-
plus contract.
Under a cost-plus contract, the producer receives the
cost-plus price if the current market price is less than the
contract price for that week. The difference over the market
price that the producer receives is recorded in a ledger
account. It is often required that this ledger account have a
zero balance at the end of the contract period. If the ending
balance is not zero, the party that is ahead must either the
pay the balance to the party that is behind, or the contract is
extended. This analysis assumes that, at prices below the
cost-plus price, the producer receives the cost-plus price.
Two different procedures are modeled at prices above the
cost-plus level. In the first, the producer receives the cost-
plus price and pays back the ledger account balance with the
difference between the current price and the cost-plus price.
Then the producer receives half of the difference between the
current price and the cost-plus price with the other half
going to establish a positive balance in the ledger account.
In the second, the producer does not begin to pay back the
amount owed until the cash price exceeds the cost-plus price
by a cushion of $4/cwt. Then the full difference between the
cash price and the cost-plus and cushion is paid toward the
negative ledger account. The producer receives the full cash
price once the ledger account is paid off and no positive
balance is maintained. Interest at 5% is charged (earned) on
negative (positive) balances.
The analysis is based on 100 lb. of hogs sold every week.
The ledger amount accumulated at the end of the contract
would be multiplied by the cwt. that a producer markets on
average each week to arrive at the total balance in the
account.
Table 1. Budgeted cost of hog production for cost-plus contract, per cwt.
Non-feed cost per cwt. $14.00
Whole-herd feed efficiency 350
Diet percent corn (%) 80
Vitamins, minerals, and additives per ton of feed $35.00
 River                                      Decatur Soybean Meal                                      
                                                                                                          
 Corn  $180  $200  $220  $240  $260  $280  $300
$2.50 38.93 39.63 40.33 41.03 41.73 42.43 43.13
$3.00 41.43 42.13 42.83 43.53 44.23 44.93 45.63
$3.50 43.93 44.63 45.33 46.03 46.73 47.43 48.13
$4.00 46.43 47.13 47.83 48.53 49.23 49.93 50.63
$4.50 48.93 49.63 50.33 51.03 51.73 52.43 53.13
Window contract. The window contract examined has a
$38/cwt. lower boundary and a $48/cwt. upper boundary,
and the producer and packer equally share prices above and
below the boundaries. If the current price is between $38 and
$48, the producer receives that price. If the current price is
below $38, the producer receives $38 minus half of the
difference between $38 and the current price. For example, if
the current price is $33, the producer receives $38 - (38 -
33)/2 = $35.50. If the current price is above $48, the
producer receives $48 plus half of the difference between $48
and the current price. At a current price of $56, the producer
receives $48 + (56 - 48)/2 = $52. Although window
contracts often do not require that a residual account be kept,
this analysis monitors the residual account to measure the
accumulated difference between the contract and cash prices.
Hedging strategy. A selective hedging strategy, based on a
10-day and 30-day moving average technique using daily
prices for 26 weeks prior to marketing the hogs for
slaughter, was examined. The start of the hedging period
coincides approximately with birth dates of the market hogs,
and ends with their sale for slaughter. Although only short
futures positions were considered, the hedge was placed and
lifted according to the moving average rule based on closing
prices. If a buy or sell signal is given, the transaction is
made on the following day's average price.
Results and Discussion
 To the producer, the appeal of risk-sharing contracts
will depend on the ability or willingness to bear risk and on
the amount of downside risk he or she expects to face during
the life of the contract. Although the past is not a perfect
predictor of the future, past prices offer a method of
comparing cost-plus and window contracts to cash prices
and hedging. Cash prices averaged $47.35 over the
10-year period and ranged from $27.69 to $66.06
(Table 2).
The cost-plus contract in which the ledger account does
not have a positive balance (Keep Dif) ended the period with
higher prices than the cash market due to a large negative
balance in the ledger account. The second cost-plus contract
(Split Dif), the window contract, and the selective hedging
strategy produced average prices that were less than the cash
market and nearly identical to each other (Table 2). The two
cost-plus contracts had comparable minimum prices that
were well above those of the cash minimum. The window
contract and hedging strategy had similar minimum prices
that were between the cash and the cost-plus minimum. The
cash market produced the highest maximum price and the
largest standard deviation. The cost-plus Split Dif had the
smallest standard deviation due to higher minimum and
lower maximum prices.
A cost-plus contract often calls for a zero ending balance
in the ledger account. If the balance is negative, the producer
owes the packer; if the balance is positive, the packer owes
the producer the amount in the ending balance. The residual
in this analysis is calculated on 100 lb. per week. For
example, a producer selling a semi-load a week (50,000 lb.)
would owe the packer $253,000 under the Keep Dif contract
and the packer would owe the producer $197,500 under the
Split Dif contract. The window contract had a $364,000
ledger if the packer had required it. Table 3 summarizes
estimated returns for a hypothetical producer who has
slightly higher cost of production than is
budgeted in the cost-plus contract. The producer is modeled
to have whole-herd feed efficiency of 360 pounds of feed per
hundredweight of hog produced and an 80% corn and 20%
SBM diet. An additional $35.50 per ton of feed was
included for vitamin and mineral premix and any feed
additives. The estimated producer cost assumed a 20-week
rolling average feed cost to more closely match the life of the
market hog rather than the 8-week rolling average used in
the
cost-plus contract. Nonfeed cost was set at $15/cwt. to cover
other variable and overhead costs. This producer average
cost for the 10 years was $41, similar to that of
Table 2. Summary statistics for cash marketings, cost-plus and window contracts, and selective
hedging, 1987 - 1996, ($ per cwt.).
           Cost-Plus           $38Ñ48
Keep Dif Split Dif Window Selective
   Cash     Contract    Contract    Contract    Hedge
Average 47.35 48.18 46.60 46.23 45.99
Minimum 27.69 40.82 40.75 32.85 32.13
Maximum 66.06 63.75 59.50 57.03 62.70
Std. deviation 7.03 5.00 3.83 5.07 6.15
Ending balance NA -507 395 728 NA
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he Iowa State University Swine Enterprise Records average
producer for the comparable time period. This average cost
is $3.32/cwt. less than the budgeted cost-plus minimum
price level.
Average returns in the cash market were $6.35/cwt. and
higher than all but the Keep Dif strategy, which is carrying a
negative ledger balance that would have to be paid back,
resulting in lower prices in the future. However, cash returns
were negative nearly 20% of the time (Table 4) and had the
largest range in returns,
-$10.50 to $27.65/cwt. Hedging produced lower returns
with slightly higher minimum and slightly lower maximum
returns. The percent of time this selective hedging strategy
resulted in a loss was 22.5%, comparable to that of the cash
market.
The two cost-plus strategies produced hardly any weeks
of losses for this producer. Producers with higher production
costs would have incurred some losses. Incorporating
production risk that impacts production costs would also
generate additional losses. The window contract generated
less variation in returns and a comparable percent of losses
compared with the cash market and hedging.
Conclusion
This paper compared long-term, risk-sharing contracts
offered by packers to pork producers with the cash market
and a selective hedging strategy. The considered contracts
generated lower average returns and higher minimum prices
than the cash market or the hedging strategy. The cost-plus
contract that has a minimum price tied to cost of production
reduced the incidence of a loss to near zero in the simulation
and provided the greatest risk protection. The $38 - 48
window contract produced approximately the same
percentage of loss as did the cash market and hedging
strategy.
One important requirement of the cost-plus contract is
that the ledger account must be zero in the end. That is, the
prices paid under the cost-plus contract must average those
of the cash market over the life of the contract, or the party
ahead must repay the party behind to end the
contract. Thus, the average price and return for the cost-plus
contract must be evaluated with the balance of the ledger
account in mind. In the scenario where the producer paid
into the ledger when prices were high, the account ended
with a positive balance. When the producer only paid into
the ledger account when the balance was negative and prices
were a predetermined amount above the minimum price, the
account ended with a negative balance. For the ledger to
return to zero, the average prices differ from the cash market
average price only by the interest charges on the ledger
balance.
Risk protection of long-term contracts is comparable to or
better than the one hedging strategy examined here, and
there is less transaction cost than in futures in the form of
market monitoring and decision making. Are packer
contracts the proverbial Òfree lunchÓ? Not necessarily.
Although the minimum price was higher, the window
contract did little to reduce risk of loss for the producer
modeled in this analysis compared with the cash market or
hedging, and it did exclude the chance of higher prices. The
cost-plus contract that required the producer to pay into the
ledger account resulted in a self-financed "Christmas Club."
For the time period considered, it never had a negative
balance. In the other cost-plus scenario, the packer became a
banker; he or she automatically loaned the producer the price
difference during low prices and was automatically paid back
during higher prices. Although the producer's lender
appreciates the risk reduction of this cost-plus contract, it is
doubtful that the packer has first lien on the producer's
assets.
Under any risk-sharing agreement, the packer is at risk of
the producer not complying with the agreement when prices
are higher in the cash market. The packer's interest in
sharing price risk with the producer is likely due to the
captive-supply nature of these long-term contracts. The
contract is a form of non-price competition to secure a
supply of known quality hogs for the plant. Given the
continued interest in these contracts by both packers and
producers, the industry will see continued growth and
innovation of producer-packer marketing contracts in the
future.
Table 3. Summary statistics for returns over simulated total cost by risk management strategy,
1987Ñ1996, ($ per cwt.).
           Cost-Plus          $38Ñ48
Keep Dif Split Dif Window Selective
   Cash     Contract    Contract    Contract    Hedge  
Average 6.35 7.18 5.60 5.24 4.99
Minimum -10.50 0.40 -0.12 -7.45 -9.34
Maximum 27.69 27.69 16.11 19.82 25.79
Std Deviation 7.42 5.26 3.06 5.88 6.61
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Table 4. Distribution of returns by risk management strategy, percent of weeks, 1987Ñ1996.
          Cost-Plus             $38Ñ48
Keep Dif Split Dif Window Selective
   Return ($/cwt.)    Cash     Contract    Contract    Contract    Hedge  
Less than $-5 4.2 0.0 0.0 3.1 2.5
-$5 to 0 15.6 0.0 0.2 18.7 20.0
$0 to 5 25.4 43.7 52.3 27.3 32.5
$5 to 10 28.5 36.3 38.8 29.2 27.3
$10 to 15 13.1 9.4 7.5 16.3 9.4
$15 to 20 7.3 6.9 1.2 5.4 3.7
Over $20 6.0 3.7 0.0 0.0 4.6
One area of additional research needed is exploration of
alternative futures and option strategies as risk management
and/or price enhancement tools that can replace or
complement packer contracts. Further research into packer-
producer marketing contracts may also improve their ability
to meet the needs of both parties. Although the worth of
these contracts is dependent on future prices and price risk,
analysis of historical performance of provisions of such
contracts can provide useful insight.
A related area of needed research is how the increased
use of producer-packer contracts impacts price discovery,
price reporting, and overall market efficiency. Users of the
contracts have gravitated to them presumably because the
contracts enhance their operations by improving profits or
reducing risk relative to open market transactions. However,
questions remain about how these contracts may impact
market access for other producers and processors if used as a
form of price discrimination or as noncompetitive trade
practices.
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